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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effects of the involvement of informed 
investors and the presence of information asymmetry in fixed-
price mechanism on over-subscription ratio in the Malaysian initial 
public offerings (IPO). Analyzing the data on 373 IPOs listed on 
Bursa Malaysia from 2000 to 2012, we find an insignificant positive 
relationship between informed investors and over-subscription. 
However, the relationship between information asymmetry and over-
subscription is strongly negative. The negative effect of company 
size suggests that big companies that are considered to have lower 
information asymmetry receive less investors’ interest, as investments 
in low risks companies are expected to provide lower initial returns. 
Keywords: fixed price mechanism, informed investors, information 
asymmetry, Malaysian IPOs, over-subscription ratio
INTRODUCTION
In Malaysia, most IPOs are offered through fixed pricing mechanism and it makes it 
difficult for the issuers and potential investors to gauge the true value of companies. 
Investors are required to make advance payments for subscription of initial public 
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offerings (IPOs) in Malaysia. The advance payment method  renders  fixed price 
IPOs less inviting compared to the book-building pricing mechanism (Chowdhry 
and Sherman, 1996a) as the  investors have to bear the opportunity cost. However, 
in fixed pricing method, the possibility of variance in adverse selection cost for 
uninformed investors is not as high as the book-building mechanism, which is 
more uncertain. Fixed price mechanism gives the issuer and underwriters greater 
degree of freedom in setting the offer price of IPOs. However, the final offer price 
is still subject  to  the approval of  the Securities Commission (SC) of Malaysia, 
in order to ensure it is priced on a fair value basis (Abdul-Rahim and Yong, 2010). 
Similar to the practices in the United Kingdom (UK) and other Asians countries, 
for instance Hong Kong, Singapore and Thailand, the offer price of IPOs in Malaysia 
is determined within two weeks to two months prior to listing. This implies that 
the offer prices do not completely reflect the true value of the IPOs. It creates an 
opportunity for potential investors to obtain information before subscribing to the 
company shares. In general, countries with high investors demand would generally 
attempt to push up the prices of IPOs. 
Prior theoretical and empirical evidence indicates that countries that employ 
fixed pricing method, such as the UK and most of the Asian countries, have higher 
level of underpricing and over-subscription ratio (Chowdhry and Sherman, 1996a). 
They argue that when there is information leakage from the informed investors due 
to the allocation of shares largely to informed investors, a larger over-subscription 
level could be observed. The level of over-subscription also increases when there 
is a longer period between offer date and closing of the bidding date, giving rise 
to information leakage (Chowdhry and Sherman, 1996a and 1996b). 
This study is motivated by Chowdhry and Sherman (1996a) who stated that 
over-subscription ratio (a proxy used to represent investors’ demand) is vital to the 
success of an IPO issuance as it is a good indicator of companies’ value. In an attempt 
to understand more about investors demand on IPO, this study extends the work 
of Low and Yong (2011) by examining the involvement of informed investors and 
the presence of information asymmetry, which have not been explored by previous 
researches1. Informed investors or institutional investors are considered to be a long 
term investor (Gasparino, 1999).  They normally trade in large transaction and hold a 
substantial share in a firm. Thus, their presence would very much affect the demand 
on IPOs. Lin et al. (2007) argued that when IPO shares are more valued, informed 
or institutional investors are more inclined to subscribe to the IPOs as compared to 
uninformed investors as the informed investors would have information about the 
quality of the IPOs. Based on Rock’s (1986) winner curse hypothesis, it is argued 
1 This is according to the authors’ knowledge
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that insiders or informed investors know better about the true value of a company 
as compared to uninformed investors (Ritter and Welch, 2002). Informed investors 
would only subscribe to the IPO if they believe the company would have a better 
prospect. As such, most likely the uninformed investors would invest in the IPO. 
Furthermore, the presence of information asymmetry is also expected to play 
a significant role in explaining oversubscription of IPOs. Information asymmetry 
is associated closely to the size of firms. Big firms would normally have a longer 
track record of operating history and their data is made publicly available. They 
are followed by financial analysts. Thus, there is less information asymmetry on 
big firms. In contrast, small and young firms have a higher uncertainty where the 
level of information asymmetry is high which makes it difficult to estimate its value 
(Goergen et al., 2006). Investors would be reluctant to subscribe to IPOs with a 
higher information asymmetry unless they are compensated with higher returns. 
It is proposed that participation of informed investors and effects of information 
asymmetry (firm size) provide a signal of the future prospects of a company. As 
informed investors are the institutional investors, they have access to detailed 
information on the firm’s future prospects. Thus, greater  involvement of  informed 
investors  provides a good signal to the uninformed investors (Chowdhry and 
Sherman, 1996b). Meanwhile, as argued by Eldomiaty (2008), the level of 
information asymmetry in developing markets is higher than in developed markets. 
Thus, it does not allow investors to simply accept the findings from other markets. 
Hence, this study aims to shed light on selected important pre-listing information 
(involvement of informed investors and information asymmetry effects) that affects 
investors demand during the subscription period. 
The findings of this study would benefit issuers as they would understand 
factors that might affect investors demand on fixed price IPO. This would help them 
to manage the IPO in an efficient and effective manner. For investors, information 
from this study would enable them to make better investment decision when buying 
IPO particularly for the uninformed investors. They would be able to decide whether 
or not to follow the decision of informed investors in subscribing to IPOs as these 
investors have better knowledge on the prospect of a company as suggested by the 
winner curse hypothesis. Furthermore, investors could also decide whether or not 
to participate in companies with a higher information asymmetry that have higher 
risks and returns. Most importantly, it would benefit the regulator to improve on the 
existing guidelines and regulation so as to protect investors’ interest. The finding 
of this study would enable the regulator to know whether informed or institutional 
investors could determine the oversubscription of IPOs. If they could, action would 
need to be taken to curb the problem to ensure the price of the IPOs is not far off its 
true value. Furthermore, the result of this study reveals that investors are attracted 
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to subscribe to small companies that have a higher information asymmetry, the 
regulator would probably need to have a stringent disclosure requirement on small 
companies so as to reduce information asymmetry. This is clearly stated in the 
Malaysia Financial Sector Blueprint 2011-2020. A transparent environment with 
less information asymmetry would attract broader types of participants which could 
in turn contribute in developing our market as a center of economic activity in the 
Asian region. The rest of the paper discusses the literature, research methodology, 
findings and finally, the conclusion of the present study.
RELATED LITERATURE 
In fixed price mechanism, an IPO price is determined prior to the allocation. 
In contrast, the price of an IPO in book-building mechanism is determined by 
compiling and comparing bids among groups of investors. As stated by Chowdhry 
and Sherman (1996a and 1996b), over-subscription ratio is a credible source of 
information in fixed-price mechanism. This is because retail investors have to 
make advance payments for the IPOs and they face unknown potential investor 
demand for the price that has already been fixed. Further, in fixed price mechanism 
system, including in Malaysia, issuers are not entitled for the interest on the advance 
payment, which otherwise could have been used to reduce the underpricing cost. 
However, in the book-building mechanism, interest on the advance payment method 
is not ignored. 
According to Mazouz et al. (2009), issues relating to underpricing and over-
subscription ratio vary across the different offering methods. As pointed out by Van 
Bommel et al. (2010), in fixed price mechanism investors face higher uncertainty 
on the “true” value of the IPOs in the aftermarket of trading. Ritter (1991) argued 
that companies are more attracted to go public when investors behave irrationally 
and are optimistic. The good signal not only increases the company’s share price but 
also that of the industry as well. Based on empirical works, both small and young 
companies tend to have higher information asymmetry (Goergen et al., 2006, Beatty 
and Ritter, 1986, Mohd-Rashid et al., 2014). Thus, the higher uncertainty sends a 
negative signal to investors who assume it to be risk neutral and is likely to reduce 
over-subscription. Mohd-Rashid et al. (2013) and Benveniste and Busaba (1997) 
stated that issue size does matter when investors’ demand is strong. However, Low 
and Yong (2011) found no significant relationship between over-subscription ratio 
and offer size. On the other hand, Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) showed that high 
demand IPOs are associated with  smaller offer price (small companies), which 
has  larger underpricing.
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Rock’s (1986) winner curse hypothesis suggests that companies that have 
involvement of informed investors are associated with low risks  and accordingly 
they obtain  lower initial returns. Informed investors normally have better 
knowledge of the companies and would purchase the IPOs only if they believe it is 
worth the price, such as in terms of the growth prospects of companies. This shows 
that the uninformed investors are more prone to purchase IPOs that the informed 
investors are involved in. Thus, involvement of informed investors and presence 
of information asymmetry do affect the level of investors demand. This variable is 
distinctive since none of the previous studies examined the interaction relationship 
of both informed investors and information asymmetry on investors demand.
Investor enthusiasm is one of the key features in determining investors 
demand. If the first day returns are high, generally it would attract more investors 
to bid for the IPO (Che-Yahya et al., 2014). Accordingly, when investors are 
optimistic about the shares, it creates a cascade on the demand. This argument 
is further supported by Shiller (1990) using impresario hypothesis, that is, high 
initial returns leave a good impression on  the investors. Loughran et al. (1994) 
showed that the demand for investors is high when the initial returns are high and 
investors are well informed about the investment. The above discussion shows that 
investors’ optimism does create a cascade on demand. This is especially true when 
underpricing is high which responds to investor sentiment. Very few researchers 
have associated underpricing with investor sentiment (Cornelli et al., 2006, Mohd-
Rashid and Abdul-Rahim, 2012, Mohd-Rashid et al., 2013, Fennee, 2009, Bayley et 
al., 2006). We conjecture that investor sentiment, using the proxy of dummy initial 
returns (DUMMYIR) and over-subscription, is positively correlated. 
Previous studies also show that there are other factors that play an important 
role in fixed price mechanism IPOs (Chowdhry and Sherman, 1996a and 1996b). 
Under the fixed price method, the offer price of the IPO must be set prior to the 
listing or when potential investors apply for shares. The gap between the offer and 
listing dates are on average between two to four weeks. As suggested by Loughran et 
al. (1994), a  longer period  between offer and listing  leads to greater underpricing. 
However, Chowdhry and Sherman (1996b) argued that the longer  offer periods, 
tend to increase the chances of information leakage and if it is good to buy the 
shares, it would  cascade the over-subscription. Thus, present study uses DELAY 
as a proxy for information leakage.
In addition, in fixed-price mechanism, investors face the opportunity cost of 
funds from the time they submit the application until the IPO goes for listing. Fung 
et al. (2004) and Low and Yong (2011) found  that when there is a longer period 
between the last day of IPO application and the listing date, it  signals  low quality 
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IPOs and reduces bidding applications by investors. This study follows Low and 
Yong (2011) in using proxy for the opportunity cost of funds (OCF), that is, the 
last day of application to the listing date of the IPO.
The demand and supply theory model shows that a company with lower offer 
price is associated with increasing investors’ demand. Investors are more likely to 
bid for IPOs where prices are normally set lower, as they believe it is undervalued. 
Assuming that investors are optimistic, higher investor demand pushes up the initial 
returns. In other words investors are compensated with higher initial returns for 
bearing high risks (lower offer price) IPOs. Offer price has been used as a proxy 
for risk in previous studies by Willenborg (1999) who found that offer price is 
positively and significantly associated with initial returns.  Bradley and Jordan 
(2002) measured the risk of IPOs using the reciprocal of the offer price. Their 
finding also showed that initial returns and risks are positively and significantly 
correlated. Further, Beatty and Welch (1996) argued that a small company with 
a lower offer price tends to attract more investors to subscribe to the IPOs. Thus, 
we infer that risk of IPOs (RISK) and investors’ demand are positively correlated.
The phenomenon of hot market also plays an important role in influencing 
investor optimism. According to Loughran and Ritter (2002), recent market 
conditions reflect investor interest in subscribing to IPOs.  Ma and Faff (2007) 
and Mahmood et al. (2011) argued that the most recent market conditions prior to 
IPO listing does influence investors sentiment and over-subscription. Derrien and 
Womack (2003) used the three months pre-IPO market price to proxy for market 
conditions (MKTCON). Therefore, we conjecture that market conditions and 
investors’ demand are positively correlated. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The sample of this study comprises 373 IPOs, listed on Bursa Malaysia (Malaysia’s 
Stock Exchange) between 2000 and 2012. Data on IPOs were from January 
2000 onwards to allow sufficient time for the Malaysian market to recover from 
the Asian 1997/98 financial crisis. The one-year gap after the crisis reduces any 
lingering effects of the Asian financial crisis. The data on IPOs were from the 
Bursa Malaysia website, company prospectus and Star-online. The data on over-
subscription ratio were from various newspaper reports. The sample of the IPOs 
in this study excludes IPOs that involve restricted offer-for-sale; restricted public 
issues; restricted offer–for-sale to eligible employees; restricted offer-for-sale 
to Bumiputera investors (Malays and indigenous people); special and restricted 
issues to Bumiputera investors; tender offer; and special issues. This is to avoid 
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less meaningful outcomes, which is consistent with Abdul-Rahim and Yong (2008) 
and Yong (2007). Finally, the sample of this study excludes companies that have 
an extreme outlier and IPOs that have limited information availability.
To examine the impact of the involvement of informed investors and 
information asymmetry on over-subscription ratio, a cross sectional regression 
model is applied as follows:
OSRi	 =	 a	+	β1 DPRIVATEi + β2 MKTCAPi + β3 DummyIRi +  
β4 DELAYi	+	β5 OCFi	+	β6 RISKi	+	β7 MKTCONi	+	εi
(1)
where OSR is over-subscription ratio, DPRIVATE is institutional investor 
participation, market capitalization (MKTCAP), investor sentiment (DummyIR), 
information leakage (DELAY) , opportunity cost of fund (OCF), IPO risk (RISK), 
and market condition (MKTCON).
Further analysis is carried out to examine the interaction effect between 
informed investors (institutional investors) and information asymmetry, as the 
present study believes that the signaling mechanism differs according to the level 
of information asymmetry. This argument is also consistent with Yung and Zender 
(2010) who claimed that the level of information asymmetry in the IPOs  does 
affect the signaling mechanism. Therefore, the present study argues that level of 
information asymmetry moderates the relationship between informed investors and 
investors’ demand. This moderating effect is examined using the interaction term 
(DPRIVATE x MKTCAP) which is entered into the regression model as follows:
OSRi	 =	 a	+	β1 (DPRIVATE * MKTCAP)i + β2 DPRIVATEi  
+ β3 MKTCAPi + β4 DummyIRi	+	β5 DELAYi  
+	β6 OCFi	+	β7 RISKi	+	β8 MKTCONi	+	εi
(2)
The dependent variable in this study is the over-subscription ratio (OSR) which 
indicates the investors’ demand and it measures the number of times the IPO is 
oversubscribed. A positive over-subscription indicates that the IPOs are demanded 
more than they are supplied while a negative over-subscription ratio implies lower 
investors demand. In Malaysia, Abdul-Rahim and Yong (2010) found  that  higher 
demand puts upward pressure on the aftermarket price of the IPO, which results 
in an increase in initial returns. The formula for OSR is as follows;
OSR = 
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The two independent variables are the involvement of institutional investors (or 
informed investors) and information asymmetry effect. Firstly, offers of shares to 
institutional investors are proxied through private placements.  In the present study, 
institutional investor involvement is proxied by a dummy for private placements 
(DPRIVATE), in which one represents IPO issued through private placements and 
zero otherwise. Level of information asymmetry is proxied using the company 
size, which is measured based on the market capitalization of the IPO.  The large 
market capitalization is associated with big company size that has low information 
asymmetry effect and vice versa. Past studies that used market capitalization as a 
proxy for company size include those by Chambers and Dimson (2009), Chahine 
et al. (2011), and Yung and Zender (2010). Similarly, Goergen et al. (2006), Beatty 
and Ritter (1986) and Barclay and Smith (1995) used size as a proxy for level of 
information asymmetry on small and young companies that are more exposed to 
greater  uncertainties and higher level of information asymmetry. The formula for 
market capitalization (MKTCAP) is as follows:
MKTCAP = Pre – IPOSharesxPOfferPrices (4)
Five variables found to be significant in over-subscription studies are the 
control variables. When investors are enthusiastic about the IPO, the investors’ 
demand would be high. We use dummy initial returns (DUMMYIR) as suggested 
by Low and Yong (2011), but  the measurement differs slightly,  where  dummy 
1 consists of companies with initial returns higher than the  average of the IPO 
initial returns for the whole year and zero for IPOs with lower than average initial 
returns. The present study hypothesizes that when investor enthusiasm is high, the 
over-subscription ratio increases. The longer the gap between the offer and closing 
dates of IPOs, the greater the opportunity for information to leak out. Thus, it would 
reduce the over-subscription ratio (Chowdhry and Sherman, 1996b). This study 
uses the number of days from the IPO opening until closing of the application to 
represent information leakage (DELAY). The third variable, as put forth by Fung et 
al. (2004), is the advance payment method in Malaysia that creates an opportunity 
cost of funds for potential investors due to the length of time from the last day of 
IPO application to the listing date. Investors lose the interest income earned from the 
other securities by putting their money as advance for the IPO allocation, without 
knowing whether they would succeed in subscribing to the IPOs. Following Low 
and Yong (2011), Fung et al. (2004), we use the number of days from the last day of 
IPO application until its listing date to proxy the opportunity cost of funds (OCF). 
The present study also argues that company risk could influence investor’s decision 
to subscribe. To attract investors, companies with high risks would compensate with 
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high initial returns. The high risk IPOs would have a lower offer price to attract 
investors. We use reciprocal of offer price to represent company risk (RISK), as 
suggested by Bradley and Jordan (2002). The fifth variable, that is, prior market 
conditions also influences the over-subscription ratio. As indicated by Derrien and 
Womack (2003) and Agarwal et al. (2008), hot market conditions  lead to over-
subscription. To represent the market conditions (MKTCON), we use the average 
of three months EMAS index returns prior to IPO listing. We hypothesize that 
market condition is positively related to over-subscription ratio.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample of 373 IPOs, listed from 
January 2000 to December 2012. The average over-subscription ratio is 30.45 
times, and the minimum over-subscription is –0.89 times, while the maximum 
over-subscription is 263 times. This indicates that over-subscription ratio varies for 
each IPO issued in Malaysia. The large differences in over-subscription supports 
motivation of this study to examine factors that influence investors demand.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of variables (January, 2000 to December, 2012)
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max.
Over-subscription  
(times)
30.45 16.37 42.30 –0.89 263.42
Private Placements  
(RM million)
24.78 9.00 103.29 0.00 1885.00
Market Capitalization  
(RM million)
470.03 72.00 2734.85 16.00 40400.00
Initial returns (%) 28.90 15.33 52.33 –50.55 404.16
DELAY (days) 12.48 12.00 5.56 1.00 74.00
Opportunity cost of funds 
(OCF) (days)
18.64 16.00 7.89 6.00 71.00
RISK (ratio) 1.68 1.31 1.27 0.19 8.33
Offer price (RM) 1.00 0.76 0.76 0.12 5.05
Market condition (%) 4.30 4.52 12.64 –29.12 39.24
Note: Over-subscription is the number of times the IPOs are over-subscribed. Private placement is the 
involvement of informed (institutional) investors. Market capitalization is the number of pre-IPO shares 
multiplied by the offer price. Initial return is percentage change in offer price and closing price on the 
first day of listing. DELAY is number of days from opening to closing of IPO application. Opportunity 
cost of funds is the number of days from closing of the application to the listing day. RISK is reciprocal 
of the offer price. Market condition is the average return of EMAS Index, three months prior to listing.
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The average size of IPOs with involvement of informed investors (private 
placement issues) is RM24 million, while the highest value of IPOs with involvement 
of informed investors in IPOs is RM1,885 million. Market capitalization, which 
represents company size, has a mean of RM470 million, with the lowest being 
RM16 million and the highest, RM40,400 million.  This shows a huge difference 
in size between small and big companies in the Malaysian market. On average, 
the initial return is 28 per cent and the lowest is negative 50 per cent, while the 
highest is 404 per cent. DELAY a proxy for information leakage shows an average 
number of days from the opening to the closing of IPO application is 12 days, with 
the longest about 74 days and the shortest, one day.
The proxy for opportunity cost of funds is the length between closing dates 
of the application to the listing date. On average, the mean value is 18 days with 
a maximum that is close to the offer period of about 71 days. The risk of the IPO 
is on average 1.68 and up to a maximum of 8, which indicates a large variance 
between companies with high and small risks. 
Figure 1 Average Over-subscription and pre-market condition of 
IPO issues from January, 2000 to December, 2012
Finally, the market condition, reflected by the average return of three months 
EMAS index prior to the IPO listing, shows an average of 4 per cent, with the highest 
being 39 per cent and the minimum a negative 29 per cent. Figure 1 illustrates that 
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market conditions have positive association with over-subscription. The declining 
trends in market conditions could be an attributed for the lower investor demand 
(over-subscription), which indicates investors are reluctant to subscribe when the 
market is in cold condition and there is uncertainty about the investment.
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix between the variables. Most of the 
independent variables have a correlation of less than 0.6 except for DELAY and 
OCF which shows a significant relationship of 0.897. Further test, using VIF 
(variance inflation factors), is done prior to regression analysis to confirm that 
there is no multicollinearity problem. Results in Table 2 also indicate that big firms, 
with longer offer period and higher opportunity cost of funds have fewer investors 
subscribing to their IPOs.
Table 3 displays the differences between high and low investors demand, 
big and small companies, high-private and low-private investors. Panel A shows 
that high and low investors demand IPOs differ substantially. The high investors 
demand group has an over-subscription ratio of 77.11 times compared to the low 
demand, which is 2.43 times. The company size differs dramatically between big 
and small companies. Results show that there is high investors demand for the 
small companies’ IPOs that have lower offer price. This contributes to the higher 
initial returns for the highly demanded IPOs. It shows that the investors are more 
interested to subscribe to the IPO if the offer price is low and there is greater 
involvement from informed investors when the market condition is relatively good.
Another interesting point to note is that small companies have higher informed 
investors’ involvement and this influences investors to subscribe more shares. As 
mentioned before, the involvement of informed investors signals that the company 
has good future prospects. The winner’s curse theory also suggests that investors 
face less adverse selection problems, if the IPOs have the involvement of large 
informed investors.
Panel C represents the difference between high and low private placements. 
The highly informed investors (high private placements) prefer to subscribe to 
IPOs with lower offer prices (represented by small companies) due to expectation 
that investors would receive higher initial returns for high risk IPOs. In Panel B, 
the opportunity cost of funds is lower for the small companies, which might attract 
informed investors to subscribe to the IPOs.
The cross-sectional multiple regression analysis results shown in Table 4, 
quantify the role of company size (information asymmetry) and informed investors, 
in explaining investors demand (over-subscription ratio). The coefficients 
reported in Table 4 are generated using the Newey-West procedure to correct for 
autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson is initially 1.44). The heteroskedasticity White 
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test detects heteroskedasticity problems, hence, ‘White consistent standard errors 
and covariance’ are used instead. The regression model also passes the RAMSEY 
test for model specification.
The results in Table 4 are consistent with the correlation analysis in Table 2. 
The adjusted-R2 shows that the independent variables in the model could explain 
21 per cent of the variations in over-subscription ratio. We find that company size 
(MKTCAP) is strongly negative in explaining the over-subscription ratio. That is, 
the bigger the company size (lower information asymmetry), the lower the number 
of investors who subscribe to the IPO. Another possible explanation is that big 
companies have larger issue size, such that over-subscription is lower because 
there are more shares to meet the demands of investors. This finding is in line with 
Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) who found that small companies are associated with 
high  demand. The result is also consistent with Benveniste and Busaba (1997) 
who stated that company size does matter in explaining  over-subscription. In the 
context of this study, the company size, which reflects the level of information 
asymmetry, does influence the rate of over-subscription of IPO. Companies that 
face greater uncertainty have higher demand from the investors. 
Meanwhile, involvement of informed investors (DPRIVATE) is positive but 
insignificant in explaining the over-subscription ratio. The positive relationship 
is consistent with Rock (1986) who argued that the higher the involvement of 
institutional investors, the higher the demand and accordingly the returns. As 
informed investors subscribe more to shares that they believe have good prospects, 
the involvement of informed investors is expected to create a herd mentality among 
the others. However, the findings in this study show no significant relationship 
between private placement and over-subscription. The findings are contrary to the 
winner’s curse argument. This could be due to the expectation from investors that 
participation of informed investors who are knowledgeable would lead to price 
amplification of the IPO and hence generate interest among investors to subscribe.
Evidence of investors’ enthusiasm (DUMMYIR) is positively significant in 
explaining the over-subscription ratio. This finding is consistent with that of Cornelli 
et al. (2006), Sahoo and Rajib (2010) and Low and Yong (2011). Thus, enthusiasm 
of investors, based on the movement of price (underpricing), reflects investors’ 
over-subscription and leaves an impression that the underwriter is offering a good 
IPO. The finding also supports impresario hypothesis put forward by Shiller (1990), 
that is, investors impression creates demand for the IPOs.
As for information leakage (DELAY), it is negatively related to over-
subscription but the finding is not significant. The negative coefficient suggests 
that the longer the offer period for investors to place their order, the lower the 
over-subscription. This is not surprising since, the longer offer period suggests 
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the highest possibility of information leakage, which could cause the issue to fail 
should any bad news be revealed. Thus, investors face a high risk on IPOs that 
have longer offer period and accordingly investors would lower their demand for 
such IPOs. This finding is consistent with that of Chowdhry and Sherman (1996b), 
who stated that under the UK method the price is set early, and  the longer offer 
periods do create  information leakage.
We find a significant negative relationship between the opportunity cost of 
funds (OCF) and over-subscription ratio. The result is not surprising, since investors 
in Malaysia have to pay an advance for allocation of shares applied. The longer 
the period from the closing of IPO application to the listing date, the higher the 
opportunity cost of funds. Thus, it reduces the investors’ interest to subscribe to the 
IPOs. The finding is also consistent with Chowdhry and Sherman (1996b) who argue 
that the costs of subscribing increase when there is high demand from investors.
The risk of the IPO measured using the reciprocal of offer price shows that it 
is positive and highly significant in explaining the over-subscription. It indicates 
companies with high risk (lower offer price) obtain more subscriptions from 
investors. This is because investors realize that they are compensated with high 
Table 4 Regression results for over-subscription model for 373 IPOs, 
listed from January 2000 to December 2012









Adjusted R2= 0.2183 Durbin Watson D= 1.447
F-statistic= 15.844*** Ramsey Reset Test= 2.665
Note: ***, **denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels. MKTCAP is market 
capitalization, number of pre-IPO shares multiplied by the offer price. DPRIVATE takes 
value 1 if there is participation from private placement and zero otherwise. DUMMYIR 
takes the value 1 if the returns are higher than the average initial returns. DELAY is the 
number of days between the opening and closing of IPO application. OCF (opportunity 
cost of funds) is the number of days between the last day of application and the listing 
day. MKTCON (market condition) is the average returns of EMAS Index, three months 
prior to listing. RISK is the reciprocal of the offer price.
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initial returns for bearing such high risks. This is in line with the finding in Table 3, 
that company with high risk which offers lower offer price appears to have higher 
demand from investors. The finding is also consistent with Bradley and Jordan 
(2002) who pointed out that lower offer price is more likely to create  higher returns 
through higher investors demand.
The impact of market conditions is positively and strongly significant in 
influencing the over-subscription of IPOs. It suggests that if the market condition 
before the IPO listing is hot (high returns), then it would have an advantage of 
attracting investors and creating interest for investors to subscribe to the IPOs. It 
also shows that good market condition reduces the uncertainty of the investment. 
Thus, it reduces investors’ fears and contributes to over-subscription of the IPOs. 
The result is consistent with Loughran and Ritter (2002), who conjecture that past 
market conditions influence the investors to bid for more or less of  the shares. 
Our main findings show that company size which captures the level of information 
asymmetry, investors’ enthusiasm, opportunity cost of funds, risk and market 
conditions are significant in explaining the over-subscription of IPOs. 
According to Chowdhry and Sherman (1996a), informed investors do not 
subscribe to the IPO if they have superior and ex-ante information indicating that 
the IPO is overpriced. In the light of this, we argue that the influence of informed 
investors’ participation and information asymmetry on investors demand is not 
significant. This study adds an interaction effect between informed investors and 
information asymmetry (DPRIVATE x MKTCAP) as an additional explanatory 
variable in Table 5. Further, to avoid multicollinearity problem in the interaction 
term, the centering method is used (Aiken and West, 1991). Centering method is 
done by subtracting each predictor by the mean of the predictors (Cohen et al., 
2003). 
The finding in Table 5 shows that, the interaction term is significant and 
negatively related to over-subscription at the 10 per cent level. From the finding, 
it is evident that the involvement of informed investors becomes significant by 
having an interaction term (DPRIVATE x MKTCAP). The result shows the influence 
of informed investors on over-subscription depends on the level of information 
asymmetry. It is expected that the demand of IPOs would be significantly higher 
if the firm size is smaller. In other words, if there exists institutional investors and 
firm size is smaller there will be a higher demand on IPOs. However, if there is no 
involvement of institutional investors, whether or not the firm size is small or big, 
it would not influence investors to subscribe. Further, the influence of institutional 
investors or private placement would only be significant if the firms have a higher 
information asymmetry.
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Our finding supports the argument by Chowdhry and Sherman (1996b) that 
informed investors subscribe and bid for good quality IPOs as they have superior 
information about the companies. The public only becomes aware of the information 
that is available to informed investors at the time the IPOs are over-subscribed. 
Informed investors would only bid for the share if they believe that its true value 
is higher than the offer price. Further, informed investors are more attracted to 
subscribe to the IPOs of small companies (as shown in Table 3) for speculative 
purposes. As argued by Yong (2013), small companies are more speculative, thus 
investors  bid for the share to gain  higher initial returns on the day of listing.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The present paper examines the effects of information asymmetry and involvement 
of informed investors on over-subscription of IPOs, using data from 373 IPOs, 
listed from January 2000 until December 2012. The preliminary result suggests that 
average over-subscription is about 30 times. There is a wide difference between 
high and low over-subscription ratio. This indicates that investors’ preference to 
subscribe varies in this market. Our findings show that company’s size (information 
asymmetry) is negatively significant in explaining over-subscription of IPOs. It 
implies that the higher the information asymmetry level, the greater the investor 
interest to subscribe as investment in companies with high risks are compensated 
Table 5 Interaction effect between private placement and market capitalization










Adjusted R2= 0.219 Durbin Watson D= 1.447
F-statistic= 14.084*** Ramsey Reset Test= 2.454
Note: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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with higher initial returns. The finding also suggests that to increase the interest 
of  investors, companies should have lower opportunity cost of funds, that is, the 
IPOs are offered under good market conditions, high investors’ enthusiasm, and 
lower offer price. The reason being, once investors realize that the issue price is 
“low”, there is over-subscription of the company’s shares. Other findings show that 
there is no significant relationship between informed investors and offer period 
with IPO over-subscription. However, by adding an interaction term between 
informed investors and information asymmetry level, a significant negative 
relationship is observed between the interaction term (DPRIVATE x MKTCAP) 
and over-subscription. It indicates that the influence of informed investors on over-
subscription depends on the level of information asymmetry.
In Malaysia, investors place their IPO’s subscriptions and advance payment 
for the application without knowing the actual number of shares they would obtain. 
Similarly, issuers fix the offer price of IPOs without knowing the investors demand 
or interest on their shares. Thus, to compensate the adverse selection problem and 
uncertainty, investors obtain higher initial returns, especially in companies with 
higher uncertainty. The finding of this study suggests that in fixed price mechanism, 
regulators should ensure issuers disclose important information that might affect 
investors’ decision to subscribe to the IPOs.
Result of this study is constrained by a limited number of variables to 
understand factors affecting over-subscription of IPOs. It is likely that other 
factors, such as underwriter’s reputation and macroeconomic variables might affect 
investors demand. Besides, there might be other proxies that could be used as an 
alternative to some of the variables used in this study. For example, the number of 
institutional investors given private placement or the percentage of units through 
private placement could be utilized to represent institutional investors. Similarly, 
a better measure could be used to replace firm size as a proxy for information 
asymmetry. This is because firm size is not only being used specifically to represent 
information asymmetry but was also used as a proxy for firm visibility, financial 
market access and noise trading in other research. The use of these different proxies 
may improve the result of this study.  
Another limitation of this study is related to involvement of informed investors 
and presence of information asymmetry. The argument in the literature shows 
that there were two opposing forces at work. An existence of informed investors 
exacerbates information asymmetry whereby a high level of information asymmetry 
would shun uninformed investors from subscribing to the IPOs, thus providing a 
negative signaling effect to the market. In contrast, when informed institutional 
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investors subscribe to the IPOs, uninformed investors would follow suit as generally 
informed investors would know the true value of a company, hence providing a 
positive signaling effect to the market. With such propositions, future research 
should focus on a model that is specified in quadratic form.
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